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Using a real option reasoning perspective we study the uncertainties and irreversibilities that 
impact  the  investment  decisions  of  firms  during  the  different  phases  of  technological 
transitions.  The  analysis  of  transition  dynamics  via  real  options  reasoning  allows  the 
provision of an alternative and more qualified explanation of investment decisions according 
to  the  sequentiality  of  pathways  considered.  In  our  framework,  flexibility  management 
through  option  investments  concerns  both  the  incumbent  and  the  future  technological 
regime. In the first case it refers to ex-post flexibility management and in the second case to ex-
ante flexibility management. 
 








1.  Introduction 
 
Several contributions dealing with the evolution and development of large technical systems 
(LTS) (Hughes, 1987; Davies, 1996; Walker, 2000; Markard & Truffer, 2006) have helped to 
better  understand  the  emergence  and  transformation  dynamics  of  complex  technological 
systems  characterized  by  heavy  infrastructures  and  capital  intensive  investments  and 
organized around a variety of actors and institutions. An important contribution of the LTS 
literature  has  been  to  insist  on  the  multiplicity  and  the  composition  of  factors  (political, 
technological, social, economic, scientific, etc.) contributing with a similar and parallel force 
to the development of technical systems and to phenomena such as technological trajectories, 
path-dependency  or  “lock-in”  and  also  to  the  emergence  and  adoption  of  radical 
innovations. 
 
In a similar vein, by insisting on the co-evolutionary dynamics of system innovations, the 
socio-technical transition approach (Geels, 2002; Smith et al., 2005; Geels & Schot, 2007) has 
focused on the way some societal functions such as transport, communication and energy 
supply  are  structured  around  systems  of  complementary  elements  including  technology, 
infrastructure,  retail  and  distribution  networks,  regulation,  user  practices,  markets  and 
culture.  The  socio-technical  transition  approach  considers  transition  processes  from  the 
multi-level perspective where system innovations come about through the interplay between 
dynamics at three different levels: (1) technological niches; (2) socio-technical regimes; and 
(3) the socio-technical landscape. Stress is put upon the idea that system innovations and 
transition processes evolve through the interactions between the dynamics that characterize 
each level. The multi-level perspective thus underlines different transition pathways, each 
possessing  its  proper  logic  and  corresponding  to  specific  interactions  among  these  three 
levels. Transition dynamics are in this way not the consequence of a single driver but result 
from  ongoing  processes  at  different  levels  simultaneously  whose  interactions  can  either 
accelerate system innovations or slow down their deployment. 
 
Our  contribution  both  builds  upon  and  departs  from  the  literature  on  socio-technical 
transition processes. It builds upon the socio-technical transition approach in that it is based 
on  the  different  stylized  pathways  that  characterize  the  transition  process  (reproduction, 
transformation,  de-realignment,  deployment  paths).    We  adopt  however  areal  options 
reasoning  approach  in  order  to  better  account  for  the  uncertainties  and  irreversibilities 3 
(characterizing  both  incumbent  and future  technical  systems)  that  impact  the  investment 
decisions of firms during the different transition phases. 
 
By taking explicitly into account the role of uncertainty in investment decisions, real option 
models insist on the importance of flexibility in adjusting decisions as uncertainty resolves 
and give an alternative vision of transition dynamics through a more qualified explanation of 
firms‟ investment decisions. In fact, uncertainties and irreversibilities are not confined to 
specific  pathways;  rather  their  nature  and  form  change  when  one  goes  through  distinct 
pathways.  We  thus  explicit  more  precisely  the  impact  these  changes  might  have  on 
investment modes by analyzing the appropriate options at each phase. From the real options 
perspective investment behavior along the transition process can be expressed as a dynamic 
portfolio  of  parallel  (within  the  same  path)  and  sequential  (representing  the  transition 
process)  options  through  which  firms  manage  the  sequence  and  temporality  of  their 
decisions in  a  proactive  way.  During  this sequence,  the  transition  pathways,  the  options 
selected and those exercised reflect the will of actors to balance strategically between on the 
one hand holding a certain degree and form of flexibility necessary to preserve their adaptive 
capacity and on the other hand cultivating progressively irreversibilities contingent on their 
positioning and their individual trajectories in order to orient future systems. As we intend 
to show, this tension between flexibility and irreversibility punctuating the transition process 
and explicited through the dynamic composition of option portfolios structures investment 
strategies and regulates the possible evolutions of system innovations. 
 
Section 2 presents our analytical framework integrating both the socio-technical transition 
approach  and  the  real  options  reasoning.  Section  3  uses  this  integrative  framework  to 









2.  Integrating technology transition dynamics and real options 
 
This section provides a brief survey on real option reasoning. It than presents an analytical 
framework integrating technology transition dynamics and real options. 
 
2.1.  Real option reasoning 
 
The real options approach (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996) constitutes  a fruitful 
framework  to  better  understand  investment  decisions  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty. 
Contrasting with traditional investment rules based on the net present value (NPV), this 
perspective takes into account the capability of managers to react flexibly to environmental 
changes and stresses the impact of varying uncertainty levels and sources between different 
project phases in explaining investment decisions. When investments are at least partially 
irreversible, NPV does not in fact consider the benefits of sequentially organizing decisions 
in  the  presence  of  uncertainty  in  order  to  better  integrate  into  the  decision  process 
information and knowledge revealed and accumulated through time. In this sense the real 
options lens provides a methodology to assess the benefits associated to the opportunities 
created and generated by flexibility. 
 
Several types of options have been highlighted in the literature, including i.e. the options to 
wait, to stage, to expand, to abandon, to switch and to grow. According to the financial 
terminology, most options can be grouped either under the category of call options or put 
options. Investments in call options may concern R&D activities, establishing joint ventures, 
or  positioning  within  new  markets.  Whereas  put  options  may  concern  the  flexibility  to 
contract the production scale or the possibility to retract through for instance equipment 
renting  or  exit  provisions  foreseen  in  a  joint-venture  contract.  Switching  options  among 
production  modes  (or  resources  or  products)  include  both  put  options  (abandoning  one 
mode) and call options (adoption of another mode). In each case, an initial investment is 
realized or a cost is borne to remain flexible in order to reduce the adjustment costs of firms‟ 
strategies. 
 
The value of a real option depends on six basic variables: (1) the present value of risky assets 
(called underlying assets) to be acquired in order to realize the project on which an option is 
held; (2) the cost of holding the option (the expenses to hold the option to  invest in the 5 
project); (3) the cost of exercising the option (expenses to acquire the assets of the project); (4) 
the duration of the option until its expiration date (decision date until which the option stays 
open  before  being  exercised);  (5)  the  volatility  of  the  underlying  assets;  (6)  the  riskless 
interest rate during option duration. 
 
If there is no volatility, there is no reason to adopt an option strategy since flexibility has no 
value. In return, for a given level of irreversibility, the option value (of flexibility) increases 
with volatility. Since an option is defined as the right but not the obligation to acquire or 
abandon an asset, holding an option creates an asymmetric risk profile: an option to invest 
benefits from risky events when uncertainty gets resolved in favor of the investment under 
consideration  by  giving  a  preferential  right  to  exercise  the  option.  If  conditions  end  up 
unfavorably, the option is not exercised and the only cost borne is the one of holding the 
option (assumed to be largely inferior to the investment cost). 
 
Whereas earlier contributions on real options have mainly insisted on the value associated to 
the option to wait or to defer (McDonald & Siegel, 1986), several contributions have recently 
considered  more  proactive  option  strategies  such  as  growth  options  giving  firms  a 
competitive  advantage  (Kulatilaka  &  Perotti,  1998).  Even  if  the  logic  that  underlies  both 
deferral and growth options is based on the value of flexibility, this value does not derive 
from the same source for each option. Deferral stresses the value to delay investment in 
order to benefit from the arrival of new information. Growth options insist on the value of 
early investment in order to develop the capabilities necessary to facilitate preferential access 
to future opportunities (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). 
 
Both options (growth and deferral) advocate a different investment strategy if we take the 
NPV as a reference. An investment which could be justified by the NPV rule (NPV>0) may 
not be engaged if firms adopt the logic of the deferral option. According to this option, a firm 
will  only  invest  if  the  revenues  expected  from  the  uncertain  project  cover  not  only  the 
investment  cost  but  also  the  additional  option  value  of  waiting.  The  reason  why  a  risk 
premium has to be paid to motivate investment becomes clear when one considers that by 
investing a firm loses its flexible position. In the case of growth options, an investment can be 
initiated even if the NPV rule advocates not to invest (NPV<0). Some form of irreversibility 
may be accepted in order to create preferential access to potential opportunities. Since the 
value of future investments depends on already engaged investments, an early investment 6 
can be considered as an entry price to create the opportunity to participate in the sequence of 
expected projects to come. 
 
This ambiguity about the investment behavior of firms under uncertainty compels us to have 
a closer look at uncertainty sources and to differentiate the role of different contingencies 
which characterize the competitive environment of firms during the successive stages of a 
project in order to better understand option strategy choices (Folta & O‟Brien, 2004; Leiblein 
& Ziedonis 2007). This dynamic perspective is all the more important as the issue we are 
dealing with relates to the transition process from one technical system to another. Bowman 
& Hurry (1993) stress the sequential character of discovering, holding and exercising options. 
The development of an option strategy for firms is in fact a challenging one. It forces them to 
act under radical uncertainty which only gets resolved as firms take actions (Nooteboom, 
2000). 
 
Unlike traditional investment models where projects are assessed independently and where 
their  values  are  considered  additively,  real  option  models  insist  on  the  importance  of 
interactions between investments (Trigeorgis, 1996). Generally the acquisition of an option is 
the key to open new options. Furthermore, since options interact, the choice of an option is 
likely to affect the value of pre-existing options. Similarly, since holding an option has a cost, 
adding options to a portfolio does not necessarily increase the portfolio value. An option 
portfolio strategy should therefore be considered as a trade-off between different options 
according to the uncertainties firms prioritize (firm-specific, technological, market, and/or 
policy  uncertainty).  We  can  thus  assume  that  an  option  strategy  in  the  socio-technical 
transition perspective will consist in trading-off in a dynamic way between different parallel 
and/or  sequential  option  types  according  to  the  priorities  regime  actors  set  upon  the 
uncertainties they are faced with during the transition process. 
 
Before  developing  further  our  main  arguments  on  socio-technical  transitions,  we  briefly 
insist on some key points which fuel the debates on the applicability frontier of real options 
(Adner & Levinthal, 2004). These debates stem from the assumptions that underpin financial 
and real option models. 
 
For Adner & Levinthal (2004), three assumptions are key to extrapolate in a proper way the 
financial options assessment methodology to real options: (1) the financial option value (and 7 
that of the underlying asset and its strike price) is exogenous to the investors‟ actions, i.e. the 
investor cannot influence the intrinsic characteristics of an asset. Yet, contrary to financial 
options  firms  do  not  hold  real  options  passively.  Rather  the  decision  to  hold  an  option 
motivates a firm to improve its value by trying to change the value of the underlying assets; 
(2) the market signal on the financial option value is observable. Here again, the difference 
relates to the difficulty to observe correctly the value of real options by merely relying on 
market signals; and (3) the expiration date of the financial option is fixed ex ante, whereas 
most  options  on  strategic  opportunities  do  not  have  an  explicit  expiration  date.  Their 
expiration  date  is  rather  contingent  on  resources  committed  by  firms  and  on  their 
competitive context. It is thus an endogenous choice. Adner & Levinthal (2004) argue that 
these  differences  can  disable  the  abandoning  or  the  striking  of  a  real  option  at  the 
appropriate  moment  because  of  organizational  bias  and  stakeholder  interests.  Therefore 
when firms can endogenize uncertainty through strategic actions, the validity of the real 
option  methodology  to  assess  appropriately  investment  opportunities  can  be  seriously 
questioned.  Other  authors,  on  the  contrary,  stress  the  importance  of  endogeneity  in 
evaluation models in order to manage uncertainty proactively and account for the strategic 
behavior of firms (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004). 
 
We would argue that the violation of these assumptions, if it complicates the application of 
option  theory  to  „real‟  investments,  contributes  at  the  same  time  to  better  take  into 
consideration  the  strategic  dimension  of  actors‟  rationality.  For  instance,  whenever  these 
assumptions do not hold, the fact that options correspond to a right but not an obligation 
exacerbates the strategic dimension of decisions and creates agency problems. By holding 
options, firms generate future decisions rights. They act according to the value they attach to 
their future decision rights to realize investment choices. This strategic rationality might thus 
be  the  source  of  option  traps  (Adner  &  Levinthal,  2004)  since  it  may  bias  decisions  in 
abandoning options (tendency to disqualify valuable opportunities) or in maintaining them 
(tendency to overestimate opportunities). In a collective decision process, optional thinking 
can thus create decision dilemmas and lead to indecision or generate escalation effects. In 
fact the value of an option depends on the specific uncertainty and knowledge profiles of 
each firm. A corollary is that the same option may be held by several actors for different 
reasons. Thus, holding an option to grow may be motivated by the decision right it confers to 
wait  as  well  as  to  invest.  In  fact  holding  options  confers  the  right  to  participate  in  the 
bargaining process within system innovations and to the transition governance dynamics. 8 
Holding, abandoning or striking options can here be interpreted as shaping the ability of 
actors  to  orient  trajectories  and  to  influence  the  balance  of  selection  criteria  during  the 
transition process. To the extent that options concern future investment choices, their value 
results  from  the  convergence  of  actors‟  expectations  as  well  as  the  flexibility  of  their 
interpretative schemes concerning their potential opportunities. The value of an option is 
thus a question of interpreting problems (and solutions) and of competition between possible 
world  visions.  These  perceptions  influence  in  turn  the  recognition  of  opportunities  and 
firms‟ action strategies. 
2.2.  Transition processes, real options and flexibility 
 
We present in this section our analytical framework, the originality of which is to reconsider 
technological transition processes through the real options perspective. 
 
A typology of transition pathways has been recently proposed by Geels & Schot (2007) by 
focusing  more  particularly  on  the interactions between  the  socio-technical landscape,  the 
socio-technical  regime  and  technological  niches.  Considering  the  nature  and  timing  of 
interactions between these tree levels these authors distinguish different transition pathways 
and dynamics. 
(a) Reproduction path of the existing regime 
 
This path is characterized by the absence of pressure from the landscape and the existing 
regime  is  dynamically  stable  and  reproduces  itself.  Even  if  innovations  emerge  within 
niches,  they  are  not  adopted  by  the  regime.  The  perception  shared  by  actors  is  that  the 
regime has the required capability to solve internal problems without relying on innovations 
developed outside the regime. Progressively, the incremental innovations develop and build 
up internally to improve the performance of the regime. 
(b) Transformation path of the existing regime 
 
Although the pressure from the landscape is assumed to increase, niche innovations outside 
the  regime  are  still not  sufficiently  developed to  respond  to  these  pressures.  Faced with 
changes  in  their  selection  environment,  regime  actors  feel  thus  the  necessity  to  innovate 
internally and to use their adaptive capability to reorient their technological trajectories. The 9 
propagation of these technical developments modifies the regime from within. During this 
path,  regime  actors  might  import  competences  developed  by  niches  if  they  are  not  too 
distant from the competences of the regime. 
(c) Reconfiguration path of the existing regime 
 
Innovations  emerge  essentially  from  niches.  When  these  innovations  have  a  symbiotic 
relationship with the regime they are adopted as local solutions to improve the performance 
of the regime by keeping its rules unchanged. As regime actors begin to experiment new 
combinations  between  existing  and  new  technologies  these  progressively  trigger  more 
profound adjustments within the regime. This process leads to changes in research heuristics 
by opening up new opportunities for the broader adoption of technologies developed in 
niches without profoundly destabilizing the regime. 
(d) De-realignement path 
 
The regime is confronted with difficulties to respond appropriately to the pressures of the 
socio-technical landscape. This leads to the de-realignment of the regime and its progressive 
erosion. When there are no immediate substitutes to the regime, the pressure exercised by 
the  landscape  creates  an  uncertainty  on  how  to  allocate  innovative  resources  and  the 
domains  to  prioritize.  This  favors  the  emergence  of  multiple  niche  innovations  and  the 
exploration of multiple technological trajectories encouraged by actors external and internal 
to  the  incumbent  regime.  This  path  is  thus  characterized  by  a  prolonged  period  of 
technological  co-existence  and  competition  for  limited  resources.  Eventually  one  of  the 
innovations becomes dominant to trigger the adoption of a new regime. 
(e) Deployment path of the new regime 
 
As opposed to the preceding path, niche innovations are here sufficiently developed. Strong 
landscape  pressures  open  up  windows  of  opportunities  for  niche  actors  to  diffuse  their 
innovations  through  a  process  of  niche  accumulation  to  finally  penetrate  main  markets. 
Competition ends up by the substitution of the incumbent regime by a technological system 
initially developed within a niche. 
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The evolutionary framework on socio-technical transition processes which we have briefly 
presented  helps  to  better  define  the  interaction  dynamics  between  the  socio-technical 
landscape, the regime and the niches in order to explicit the trajectories that might structure 
the transition from one technical system (incumbent) to another (new one). Although our 
approach is closely based on this evolutionary framework and uses the transition pathways 
explicated  above,  we  particularly  focus  in  the  following  on  the  strategic  dimension  of 
transition  processes.  Our  interest  is  on  the  strategic  investment  behavior  of  actors  in  a 
context  where  the  future  performance  of  and  the  choice  concerning  the  future  technical 
system is highly uncertain. In a prospective vision, if the current state of the technical system 
is known, the question of which technical system might dominate the future, the trajectories 
and specific processes that might lead to this hypothetic system cannot have a definitive 
answer. Furthermore uncertainty is not confined to the first phases of the transition process 
but changes its nature when one goes through different pathways. In this perspective the 
transition  process  to  follow  is  not  determined  by  a  given  future  system  assumed  to  be 
superior. Rather, because of different uncertainty sources, the complexity of technological 
systems and path dependencies, flexibility and irreversibility management modes should be 
considered as essential determinants of the strategies engaged by actors during the transition 
process. 
 
The  importance  of  considering  different  flexibility  forms  during  transition  processes  has 
recently  been  stressed  by  Frenken  et  al.  (2007).  In  order  to  give  a  dynamic  real  option 
perspective  on  investment  decisions  during  such  processes,  we  refer  to  the  distinction 
introduced  by  Volberda  (1998)  between  strategic,  structural  and  operational  flexibility.  This 
distinction is used to elaborate an integrated approach between different flexibility forms 
and  the  real  options  framework  (Burger-Helmchen,  2005)  to  highlight  the  strategies  that 
might be deployed by actors to manage the transition process. As we point out each type of 
flexibility and each type of option are likely to correspond to and dominate specific paths of 




















Strategic  flexibility  is  developed  to  respond  to  circumstances  where  changes  are  largely 
unknown,  uncertain  and  unpredictable  and  where  the  outcome  can  have  wide-ranging 
impacts.  These  changes  may  be  due  to  technological  breakthroughs,  to  unexpected 
modifications  of  the  environment  that  disrupt  practices,  to  new  legislation  that  modifies 
dramatically the competitive and industrial landscape. We define strategic flexibility as the 
capability  of  regime  firms  to  choose,  initiate  and  exercise  different  types  of  real  options 
during the transition process. This strategic capacity corresponds thus to the capability of 
firms to combine several types of options according to the uncertainties and irreversibilities 
they are confronted with. The key role of strategic flexibility is to prepare, influence and 
develop in a proactive way the structural and organizational flexibilities that might prevail 
during each pathway. In a transitional perspective such flexibility refers to the capability of 
firms to manage a portfolio of options both in parallel (during a given path) and sequentially 
(as  a  sequence  of  holding  and  exercising  cascading  options  representing  the  transition 
trajectory). Furthermore, taking into account the nature of interactions among options can be 
an  additional way  to  illuminate  investment  strategies  pursued  by  firms.  Such  a  strategy 
reflects also the trade-off between different forms of uncertainty and irreversibility during 
the transition process. Although our analysis relates to the regime level, it does not exclude 
differences  among  firms  in  terms  of  option  strategies.  Even  if  the  expectations  at  the 
aggregate level may reflect the domination of certain types of options these do not imply 
necessarily homogeneity of firms. These expectations define at a given moment in time a 
dominant option strategy at the industry level and illustrate the nature of problems to be 
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solved and the nature of competition among firms and among technologies. If in a situation 
of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge some mimicry can be observed among firms, this 
mimicry creates at the same time opportunities to increase competition and differentiation 
and  offers  thus  the  possibility  to  observe  a  diversification  of  option  strategies.  In  other 
words, if for a given pathway a type of option (or a portfolio of options) may be dominant, 
some firms can always keep options on the preceding pathway and others engage option 
strategies that announce future pathways. Furthermore, firms may not only have different 
perceptions  on  the  timing  of  holding  options  but  also  on  the  timing  of  exercising  or 
abandoning them. 
 
Operational flexibility corresponds to frequent and short term changes of operational activities 
within a given technical system. They concern the volume and the mix of activities without 
however  impacting  substantially  the  relation  between  the  technical  system  and  the 
landscape. The aim is to create adequacy between the technical system and the landscape 
through a set of clearly defined routines. From the transitional perspective this repertoire of 
routines should be significantly different between the reproduction pathway (operational 
flexibility  of  the  incumbent  system)  and  the  deployment  pathway  through  which  a  new 
system  emerges  (repertoire  of  routines  defining  the  operational  flexibility  of  the  new 
regime). This flexibility is principally supported by privileging exploitation activities within 
the new system. 
 
Structural flexibility corresponds to the capability of firms to adapt the technical system to 
respond to landscape mutations or to change the structure of the landscape. This form of 
flexibility is a response to the limits achieved by operational flexibility and aims to create a 
new  repertoire  of  routines.  Structural  flexibility  may  develop  gradually  through  the 
exploration of several alternative technical systems. The objective is to create variety with 
respect to operational flexibility forms and to select the appropriate operational flexibility 
form according to the landscape characteristics that might prevail. 
 
In our framework flexibility management can concern the incumbent technical system as 
well as the future system. In the first case we refer to ex post flexibility management and in 
the second case to ex ante flexibility management. To explicit this flexibility management 
dynamics we  associate option  strategies  both  to  the  existing technical system  and  to  the 
future  system.  Real  options  on  the  incumbent  system  tend  to  optimize  ex  post  the 13 
organizational  and  structural  flexibilities  of  the  existing  system  by  trying  to  create  new 
breathing  spaces.  Real  options  on  the  future  system  manage  and  build  up  ex  ante  the 
structural and operational flexibilities of the system to come. 
3.  Option strategies and regulation of transition processes 
 
In the following we qualify more precisely the options that regulate the different transition 
pathways.  We  consider  the  transition  process  as  a  cycle  of  exploitation  and  exploration 
activities to which we associate option strategies. During the reproduction pathway option 
strategies focus on the exploitation of the operational flexibility of the existing regime. Given 
the limits attained by the exploitation of the regime, during the transformation path, firms 
orient their option strategies towards the exploration of new potentials within the incumbent 
system. In both cases regime improvements are supported by internal resources. During the 
reconfiguration  pathway,  firms  continue  predominantly  to  explore  the  existing  regime‟s 
structural  flexibility  potential  by  interacting  however  more  closely  with  emerging 
technologies  developed  outside  the  regime.  By  contrast  during  the  de-realignment  and 
deployment pathways firms‟ option and flexibility strategies are dominated respectively by 
the exploration and exploitation of alternative technological systems that might replace the 
incumbent regime. 
 
3.1.   Options regulating the reproduction path 
During  this  path  two  option  strategies  may  dominate  firms‟  investment  behavior  and 
reinforce each other to manage the uncertainties they are confronted with. 
The first is the option to wait or to defer. When the new technical system to be selected is 
unknown  and  the  investments  required  are  irreversible,  keeping  a  flexible  position  by 
deferring  investments  is  considered  to  be  economically  more  beneficial  than  immediate 
commitment. The higher the uncertainty about the future performance/price improvements 
of emerging technologies, the higher also the value of the option to wait. The abdication of 
the option to defer (or the option to invest once more useful information is revealed) creates 
an opportunity cost which must be added to the cost of immediately investing. The option to 
wait  indicates  also  that  although  the  NPV  of  a  project  might  be  positive,  it  might  be 
beneficial for firms not to invest. In other words, the adoption of an investment strategy 
based  on  the  option  value  of  a  project  integrating  the  value  of  flexibility  increases  the 14 
threshold  for  investing:  firms  invest  only  if  the  NPV  of  a  project  exceeds  its  cost  by  an 
amount equal to the deferral option value (McDonald and Siegel, 1986). 
Beside the deferral option, the option to keep the incumbent system reinforces and extends the 
reproduction path. Delaying exit, even if the NPV of a project becomes negative, may be a 
rational  decision  to  manage  the  uncertainty  and  irreversibility  of  the  incumbent  regime. 
Investments on the incumbent regime may continue until the economic losses exceed the 
option value to keep the incumbent system. The option to keep the existing system may be 
justified because of the perception that the technological frontier of the incumbent system 
has not yet been exhausted. Consequently, in a very volatile environment and when change 
is costly, the exploitation of the incumbent regime may be further encouraged. As Chi & 
Nystrom (1995) argue, a higher uncertainty on the evolution of the incumbent regime means 
a  higher  learning  potential  for  the  regime  firms  and  conduces  them  to  exploit  it  more 
intensively  until  the  cost  of  such  learning  becomes  higher  than  the  benefits  expected. 
Furthermore, the more important uncertainties on future technological alternatives and their 
adoption costs, the more regime actors will rationally choose to persist on technologies that 
might prove inferior in the long term. In other words, the higher the uncertainty level, the 
more firms will be keen to lengthen the life span of existing solutions with a low capital cost. 
Inertia in this case is not related to the  lock-in of the incumbent regime, but mirrors the 
expectations concerning the value of present and future technologies and the cost of change. 
Inertia increases with uncertainty since firms are rationally hesitant to support the cost of 
change towards competences which might become obsolete if the environment returns back 
to its previous state or because of the risk to choose the wrong alternative. 
 
A real options reasoning provides also a rationale for the hysteresis phenomenon  (Dixit, 
1992) that may affect the incumbent system: when environmental conditions do not support 
the  incumbent  regime  anymore,  investment  decisions  can  be  unaffected  and  induce  the 
regime to continue as in the past. Between the level of profits required to justify investments 
in new technical systems and the losses to motivate exit from the existing system, there exists 
an inertia zone where the regime keeps its status quo. As shown by Dixit (1992), this inertia 
zone widens with uncertainty and irreversibility. The hysteresis zone may also widen when 
several  alternative  technologies  are  perceived  as  potential  substitutes  to  the  dominant 
technology. In fact, when several technological alternatives compete, their option value to 
wait may differ. Thus, the return necessary to trigger an investment on a new technology 15 
might depend not only on the value of waiting for this technology but also on the value of 
waiting for the other technologies.  Therefore, the decision to invest in a new regime might 
depend  on  the  technological  system  possessing  the  highest  threshold  value.  Alternative 
technologies when considered together may thus increase the value of waiting compared to 
the case when they are considered independently. 
 
Before  concluding  our  analysis  of  the  reproduction  path,  it  is  important  to  insist  on  the 
perception actors have of the uncertainty they are confronted with and which plays a key 
role with respect to the type of option strategies they choose. Technological uncertainty can 
be perceived either as exogenous or as endogenous by firms (Folta, 1998). While exogenous 
uncertainty is principally resolved by the passage of time, endogenous uncertainty creates 
learning  opportunities.  Although  both  types  of  uncertainty  increase  the  value  of  option 
based strategies, they create opposing pressures on investment decisions. The uncertainty on 
the new technical system, which is perceived by incumbent firms as exogenous during the 
reproduction path, induces them to wait until such uncertainty reaches an acceptable level 
before committing investments. By contrast, the reproduction trajectory justifies the option to 
keep and to exploit the dominant system because incumbent firms perceive its uncertainty as 
endogenous. In the following we assume that during the transition process the uncertainty 
affecting emerging technologies will confer an increasing strategic importance to learning 
opportunities and to proactive irreversibility management by firms. When firms perceive 
uncertainty as endogenous it becomes also more appropriate to consider option strategies 
sequentially. The sequential nature of the transition process allows in fact diversification of 
option strategies. It also suggests that investment decisions should be evaluated according to 
the efficiency of a set of sequential moves and through the path dependency effects created 
during the transition process rather than the efficiency of a single move. 
 
It should also be noted that, even if the option to wait dominates firms‟ strategies during the 
reproduction path, this does not mean that after the shift to the following path, the threshold 
value to trigger investments on the new technical system is reached. Such a shift means 
rather an evolution in the option strategies pursued by firms because of changing conditions 
affecting the uncertainties they are confronted with. Therefore, the values of the option to 
keep and to wait depend also on other possible options that firms might choose during the 
transition process such as e.g. the options to position, to grow or to abandon. According to 
the type and level of uncertainty considered, the option to wait may for instance have a 16 
different cost and all investments may not have the same degree of irreversibility if actors 
have the opportunity to hold low cost technology positioning options or options to abandon 
or to switch technologies.  
3.2.   Options regulating the transformation path 
 
As  for  the  reproduction  path,  the  transformation  trajectory  aims  to  foster  the  existing 
regime‟s flexibility  by focusing  on  internal  resources.  Nevertheless,  during  this  path,  the 
exhaustion of the exploitation opportunities of the incumbent regime leads to reorienting ex 
post  research  strategies  towards  exploring  more  intensely  the  possibilities  to  push  its 
technology  frontier  envelope  and  to  regenerate  its  structural  flexibility.  A  first  option 
strategy is thus structured around switching options (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). The aim is to 
smooth the transition process and to avoid disruptive changes. It consists in minimizing the 
distance between exploited competences and those new to be acquired and to be mobilized. 
Firms invest in new technological alternatives which increase the value of switching1 by at 
the same time minimizing their adoption costs through exploration of opportunities on the 
vicinity of the incumbent system. This may correspond to optio ns held on “best available 
technologies” 
 
At the same time, incumbent firms, widen their competences on radically new technologies 
to improve ex ante their long term capabilities. This consists in initiating a proactive behavior 
on  emerging  solutions  in  order  to  direct  uncertainty  rather  than  to  incur  it.  Efforts  on 
emerging solutions, which are far from being stabilized, allow firms to create and structure 
opportunities through technological and organizational investments largely guided by their 
beliefs,  their  intuitions,  their  perceptual  biases,  their  interests  in  order  to  influence  the 
orientation of long term decisions. A second option strategy is thus related to  positioning 
options (McGrath, 1997). Positioning or capability investments constitute a first step towards 
holding options on the long term which gives firms the right but not the obligation to adopt 
emerging technologies. Positioning options are held to develop absorptive capabilities on 
emerging technologies in niches that might reveal critical in the future. The essential purpose 
of these options consists thus to become familiarized with the knowledge dynamics that 
                                                           
1 We define switching options in  two different ways. The first definition which is the one adopted here 
assumes the replacement of a technological system by another within the same technological paradigm. The 
second definition refers to built-in flexibility options mentioned in section 3.4 and concerns changes within 
the same technological system (in terms of resources, processes or outputs). We use the term transition for 
the passage from one technological paradigm to another. 17 
shapes these emerging technologies. Such positioning options provide firms with decision 
rights on subsequent paths and options along the transition process. 
 
Like the option to wait, positioning option value increases with uncertainty but causes an 
active commitment by firms. It becomes useful to invest for instance in R&D even if ex ante 
the NPV of a project proves to be negative. Projects with higher uncertainty are considered to 
have also a wider range of potential consequences and thus more growth opportunities. 
Since the positioning option value increases with the opportunities that a technology can 
generate (Kogut & Kulatilaka,  1994), the tendency of firms during this path might be to 
invest on generic technologies having a wider range of potential uses. It is however possible 
that some firms, particularly in niches but also within the incumbent regime adopt more 
targeted positioning options either to differentiate themselves from others or to be leaders in 
the transition process by preempting following paths. 
 












Positioning  options  can  be  assimilated  to  a  trial  and  error  management  strategy.  Since 
alternative technologies are emergent and their scientific and technical proprieties are not 
completely established, positioning investments may have a high rate of failure. Firms may 
thus integrate the abandonment risk of projects in their option strategy. This should be all 
the more so when the options considered involve high cost R&D activities. These options 
may  thus  either  end  up  by  the  abandonment  of  projects  (when  uncertainty  is  resolved 
unfavorably) or motivate additional resource commitments (when uncertainty is resolved 
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by a portfolio strategy of options to wait, to position, to combine (see next section), to grow 
or to abandon (Figure 2). Whilst providing firms with the flexibility to commit additional 
resources  to  opportunities  in  case  these  might  reveal  promising,  generic  technologies 
increase the value of the option to abandon since the resources committed to a failed project 
can be transferred to other more promising projects by minimizing the losses of keeping the 
positioning option. In fact, during the transformation path, factors increasing the value of the 
option to abandon increase also the value of the option to position and decrease the value of 
the option to wait (and thus shorten the reproduction path) since the value of the option to 
abandon makes up part of the positioning option value. It is the flexibility to abandon or to 
act sequentially that confers to the positioning option its attractiveness. 
 
But, during this path, the propensity of firms to develop option traps might also be strong. 
Firms‟ assessment of switching and positioning options depends on their opportunity set 
which is often biased by their past experience. Firms‟ intentions to influence technological 
uncertainties in a context characterized by technical controversies can thus motivate them to 
shape contingencies according to their own interests. These intentions might prevent firms 
involved  in  technological  niches  to  timely  abandon  emerging  alternatives  because  of  the 
importance they attach to them even though learning outcomes reveal disappointing. As for 
incumbent firms, their behavior may be biased towards abandoning positioning options and 
overestimating switching options. 
As shown by McGrath (1997), the value of positioning options does not only depend on 
factors specific to the technology itself (cost of absorptive capabilities or cost of developing 
the new technology which determine its option price) but also on the uncertain environment 
within which it might be deployed and which determines the revenue streams and the costs 
of its commercialization (the value and cost of underlying assets). Revenue can be influenced 
by uncertainty sources such as the structure of demand, the possible adoption speed of the 
technology, blocking strategies by incumbent actors or the existence of potential substitutes. 
Commercialization cost uncertainties can concern access to or deployment of infrastructures 
and complementary technologies. Some factors, such as the need for a new infrastructure or 
for  complementary  technologies  can  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  value  of  positioning 
options  and  exacerbate  the  value  of  switching  options.  Although  actors  may  develop 
strategies to influence favorably uncertainties affecting these factors, they may discourage 
resource  commitments on  positioning  options and favor  switching  options  to  extend  the 19 
transformation path. However, the impact of these factors on option values may be different 
according to the path considered. In fact, the need for a new infrastructure/complementary 
technologies may influence positively the value of commitment options during subsequent 
paths  since  investing  quickly  in  such  network  assets  should  have  a  key  impact  on  the 
selection between technologies and their diffusion (Lin & Kulatilaka, 2007). Thus, when the 
dominant uncertainty is related to the competition outcome among technologies these factors 
should  positively  influence  the  value  of  commitment  options  and  reduce  the  critical 
threshold level to strike them. 
 
3.3.  Options regulating the reconfiguration path 
 
Although  regime  firms  may  adopt  during  the  reproduction  and  transformation  paths 
positioning  strategies  on  emergent  technologies  to  develop  essentially  their  absorptive 
capabilities,  they  do  not  necessarily  seek  synergies  between  incumbent  and  emerging 
technologies. By contrast, during the reconfiguration path, innovations on these emerging 
technologies increasingly attract the attention of firms because of their potential to improve 
the incumbent system. The distinctive feature of the reconfiguration path is the intensity of 
interactions between dominant and alternative technologies even though these are not able 
to substitute for the former. In other words, during the reconfiguration path, firms begin to 
exploit emerging technologies mainly to continue to explore ex post the structural flexibility 
of the incumbent regime. 
 
Pistorius & Utterback (1997) define technological interactions by examining the mechanisms 
through  which  technologies  can  improve  or  inhibit  their  respective  growth  rates.  Their 
contribution goes beyond simple inter-technology competition by considering a multi-mode 
interaction framework between emerging and dominant technologies of which symbiosis, 
competition and predator-prey interactions are possible modes. 
 
It is assumed that symbiosis between dominant and emergent technologies represents the 
distinctive  trait  of  the  reconfiguration  path.  Symbiosis  creates  a  diversification  dynamic 
within  the  incumbent  regime  since  interactions  with  emergent  technologies  encourage 
further  exploration  of  the  dominant  system  without  fundamentally  questioning  its 
established  routines.  Interactions  consist  in  coupling  niche  innovations  with  a  specific 
problem within the dominant regime in order to overcome its performance limits. For the 20 
emergent technology coupling is also often necessary to favor its market growth rate. The 
emergent  technology  can  at  the  beginning  be  integrated  as  an  auxiliary  device  into  the 
incumbent technology and might become, after a period of more sophisticated combination, 
the core element of the system (Islas, 1997). In fact, symbiosis introduces a qualitative jump 
in the learning environment of both technologies which have a-synchronic positions within 
the  learning  process  going  from  experimental  exploration  to  commercial  exploitation 
(Llerena & Schenk, 2005). Since each phase of the learning process is subject to decreasing 
returns, the appropriate management of the different learning phases can be key for the 
success  of  both  technologies.  This  relates  directly  to  the  value  of  options,  which  if  not 
exercised in a timely fashion may have decreasing returns through time (Trigeorgis, 1996). In 
the case of the alternative technology, symbiosis avoids prolonging some costly positioning 
options beyond the time necessary and allows a better management of the transition from 
explorative to exploitative options. In the case of the mature technology, its combination 
with the emergent technology may set in motion a new period of intensive exploration in 
order to improve the symbiotic technology. 
 
In  the  following  we  use  the  heuristic  suggested  by  Luehrman  (1998)  to  analyze  the 
reconfiguration path from a real option perspective. Figure 3 depicts the option value space 
according to two metrics: (1) the Value-to-Cost ratio of technological assets to be developed 
which  also  includes  the  value  of  flexibility;  (2)  the  Volatility  of  the  technological  assets 
returns. The option value increases when one moves towards the South-East of Figure 3. 
Applying NPV, all projects situated within regions 1, 2 and 3 would be implemented and all 
others abandoned. Real option reasoning widens firms‟ strategic space since decisions are no 
more limited to a binary choice between « invest » and « do not invest » but create a more 



















Source: Luehrman (1998) and authors 
 
Figure  3  applies  this  reasoning  to  the  interaction  case  between  emerging  and  dominant 
technologies.  We  assume  that  the  dominant  technology  reaches  progressively  its 
performance limit and that investment costs to improve the technology marginally become 
very  high.  The  dominant  technology  is  thus  situated  in  a  region  where  firms  hesitate 
between two options: keeping it or abandoning it. Symbiosis with the emerging technology 
changes however the perception on the dominant system. It creates new opportunities for 
the incumbent system even if these are considered to be uncertain. Combination favors the 
option  to  keep  the  dominant  technology  (shift  down-right),  in  other  words  it  increases 
uncertainty with respect to its future expected Value/Cost ratio. A similar evolution takes 
place for the emerging technology. Its combination with the dominant technology shifts it 
from regions “5” or “4” towards regions “4” or “3” since it increases its positioning and/or 
growth option value and reduces the option value of abandoning or deferring it. It is easy to 
develop  our  reasoning  further  to  explicit  possible  scenarios  for  both  technologies  by 
anticipating  the  pathways  to  come.  One  possible  scenario  may  consist  in  C  becoming 
dominant while E is abandoned as an autonomous technology. Another scenario could lead 
to the domination of the emerging technology by abandoning the mature technology. 
 
One may distinguish the three paths that have been analyzed by the opposition between two 
distinct innovation perspectives that might influence the perception of options on emerging 
technologies: on the one hand the logic of large technical systems (incumbent regime) and on 
the other hand the logic of large projects on emerging technologies (niches). The incentives 
and  the  resource  allocation  process  which  underlie  these  two  different  innovation  logics 
correspond to two different strategic visions of the options held on the emerging system. 
Region 1 Invest now  Region 6 Invest never 
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Whereas  for  regime  firms  niche  initiatives  have  an  optional  quality  in  the  sense  that 
abandoning  them  may  not  have  significant  consequences,  niche  actors  are  entirely 
committed  to  these  options.  Adner  &  Levinthal  (2004)  qualify  this  opposition  by  the 
difference between « holding an option » and « being the option ». 
3.4.  Options regulating the de-realignment path 
 
The main difference between the paths already analyzed and those of de-realignment and 
deployment rests upon the following argument: whereas former paths exploit the  ex post 
flexibility potential of the incumbent regime, the latter aim to preserve ex ante the flexibility 
of future technical systems. Furthermore, a difference between the de-realignment path and 
the deployment path concerns the way flexibility is managed. During the de-realignment 
phase  operational  and  structural  flexibilities  are  preserved  through  the  diversity  of 
underlying assets in competition, whereas during the deployment phase this flexibility is 
directly incorporated within the assets deployed. 
 
Two types of uncertainty may structure option strategies during the de-realignment path. 
Technological uncertainty is here mainly induced by the lack of a dominant system. When 
technologies  co-exist  in  a  competitive  tension,  flexibility  is  maintained  by  technological 
diversity in order to hedge against the emergence of a dominant design. Nair & Ahlstrom 
(2003) provide several reasons for such technological diversity. First when technologies have 
a systemic nature, continuous innovation within sub-systems allows the whole system to 
survive by narrowing the gap among rival technologies and prevents a given system to have 
an  overwhelming  advantage  over  others.  Furthermore,  the  interactions  progressively 
developed among rival technologies may also favor their co-existence. Equally, regulatory 
and policy measures may postpone the premature adoption of a dominant design. Also the 
comparative  assessment  of  the  merits  and  limits  of  each  technology,  in  the  presence  of 
multiple  evaluation  criteria,  can  delay  technology  selection.  Firms  may  well  assess  and 
perceive differently the factors that determine the benefits and risks of each technology and, 
according to their experience, may support a different system in order to respond to the 
same  objective.  The  institutional  framework,  the  social,  economic,  strategic  and  political 
context, bargaining and power relationships can also blur technological differences. 
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Beyond  technological  uncertainty,  firms‟  strategies  are  during  this  path  also  increasingly 
oriented by market uncertainties which may for instance derive from demand heterogeneity, 
latent needs and the acceptance by users of technological functionalities new to the market. 
Market uncertainty may be managed by investments in niches (Kemp et al., 1998). In fact, 
technological competition and diversity create opportunities to develop more focused and 
differentiated segmentation strategies. During this path firms explore different segments by 
trying  to  exploit  specific  demand  attributes.  Strategic  niche  accumulation  offers  learning 
opportunities on technologies as well as markets in order to optimize the market-technology 
fit. As for technological diversity, strategic niche accumulation puts stress on the benefits to 
maintain market diversity. 
 
Considering the nature of technological and market uncertainties, critical options during this 
path are options to grow and options to diversify. Growth options are justified by increasing 
market  competition  among  firms  in  a  context  where  uncertainty  about  the  timing  of 
adoption of technologies are exacerbated and where there exist competitive advantages to 
early entry in the market. Such options can have preemptive effects, confer cost and learning 
advantages,  improve  market  share  and  profits,  and  discourage  entry  by  potential 
competitors.  Even  if  the  value  of  deferral  and  positioning  options  increases  also  with 
uncertainty, the value of growth options increases more (Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Folta & 
O‟Brian, 2004).  
 
If market uncertainty favors growth opportunities, technological uncertainty (technological 
competition) motivates diversification or hedging options (Hatfield et al., 2001; Anand et al., 
2007). The tension between commitment and flexibility is thus expressed during this path by 
the trade-off between growth and hedging options. Whereas growth options commit early 
on  market  opportunities,  hedging  options  focus  on  structural  flexibility  to  control 
technological uncertainty. Thus, the value of the option portfolio depends during this path 
on the tension between the growth potential of each underlying asset and the capability to 
maintain structural flexibility by adopting a hedging strategy. 
 
Particularly Anand et al. (2007) focus on the trade-off between growth and hedging options 
when firms face both market and technological uncertainty. To analyze possible portfolio 
effects,  these  authors  consider  beyond  the  volatility  (σ)  of  underlying  assets,  (1)  the 
correlation (ρ) between expected gains of underlying assets and (2) the exercise constraints 24 
on options (as when there is a capacity constraint that limits the possibility to exercise all 
options or when in the long term only one technology is likely to dominate), such that if 
there is n options in the portfolio only m of them may be exercised (m<n). When there is an 
exercise constraint, adding new growth options to the portfolio decreases the marginal value 
of each additional option since it has a lower probability to be exercised. The expectations of 
actors  on  these  exercise  constraints  constitute  thus  a  natural  limit  to  diversification. 
Correlation between assets has also complex effects on the portfolio value and structure. 
Whereas the hedging option value increases with a negative correlation (mutually exclusive 
technologies),  a  positive  correlation  (complementary  technologies)  increases  the  value  of 
growth options. 
 
An important reason to distinguish between market and technological uncertainty is that 
they  affect  the  value  of  options  differently.  When  technological  uncertainty  dominates  a 
firm‟s  option  portfolio  strategy  is  mainly  structured  by:  (1)  the  advantages  of  being  a 
technological leader and (2) the negative correlation between the values of rival technologies 
(mutually exclusive technologies). The first aspect improves the growth option value since it 
increases the probability that the technology developed by the firm becomes the dominant 
design.  The  second  aspect  relates  to  hedging  options.  As  competing  technologies  are 
mutually  exclusive  the  option  to  diversify  has  an  important  value  since  it  reduces  the 
negative consequences of a bet on the wrong technology by preserving flexibility and by 
delaying commitment to a single technology (Hatfield et al., 2001; MacMillan & McGrath, 
2002; Anand et al., 2007). Thus, even if the marginal contribution of a growth option is very 
low,  firms  may  continue  to  add  new  options  to  their  portfolio  because  of  their  positive 
impact on structural flexibility. Furthermore a severe exercise constraint should motivate 
firms  to  structure  their  hedging  strategy  around  profoundly  different  technologies 
(technologies that have a high negative correlation). Option portfolios in the presence  of 
technological uncertainty should thus be structured around assets negatively correlated (-
1≤ρ<0)  and  should  be  relatively  extended  in  comparison  to  the  capacity  to  exercise  the 
options acquired (large ration n/m). 
 
In return when market uncertainty dominates, the correlation choice among assets on which 
growth  options  are  held  should  tend  to  be  positively  correlated  in  order  to  exploit  the 
growth  potential  of  demand  and  to  benefit  from  technological  complementarity  and 25 
spillover effects. Furthermore, it should be preferable to choose as many growth options as it 
is possible to exercise and not more (convergence towards a ratio n/m=1). 
 
By adopting a sequential and dynamic approach we can put forward the following proposal 
with regard to the structure of option portfolios on emerging technologies: whereas during 
the transition phase between the transformation and the de-realignment paths technological 
uncertainty  should  dominate  option  portfolio  strategies,  market  uncertainty  should 
dominate portfolio strategies during the transition phase between the de-realignment and 
the deployment paths. Furthermore, once technological uncertainty is reduced, technological 
investments will also have the tendency to be focused on positively correlated assets (i.e. on 
complementary  ones).  Technological  diversification  should  thus be  motivated in  the  first 
phase  by  technological  uncertainty  and  competition  and  in  the  second  phase  by 
technological complementarities and interdependencies (Figure 4). 
 













Source: MacMillan & McGrath (2002); Anand et al. (2007); authors 
3.5.   Options regulating the deployment path 
 
The main difference between the de-realignment and deployment paths is the following: 
whereas the former promotes technological diversity to maintain ex ante structural flexibility, 
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incorporating options within the technical system which is deployed. Such built-in-flexibility 
aims  to  avoid  lock-in  into  sub-optimal  solutions  by  supporting  the  introduction  of  new 
innovations in the technical system (e.g. successive technology generations). 
 
This  path  is  characterized  by  capital  intensive  investments  to  support  the  adoption  and 
diffusion  of  the  new  technical  system.  Large  technical  systems  (transport,  infrastructure, 
energy supply) generally require years to be deployed and are conceived to operate for a 
long time despite the uncertainties over future states of the world under which they will be 
exploited.  They  show  frequent  interactions  between  design,  development  and  operation 
phases long after the end of the project (Hobday, 2000). This path is therefore defined by 
increasing interdependencies and connections between the components and sub-systems of 
the  new  regime  where  technical  standards  and  organizational  practices  will  have  to  co-
evolve  with  the  system  to  allow  for  compatibility,  interoperability  between  different 
elements. 
 
Insisting  on  the  built-in-flexibility  value  of  technical  systems,  the  real  options  approach 
brings important insights on the design, development and investment strategies during the 
deployment  path.  Built-in  option  strategies  focus  particularly  on  the  openness  and 
regenerative capacity of the design of technical systems in order to preserve its ability to 
economically  adapt  to  environmental  changes  and  to  avoid  premature  obsolescence. 
Whenever the evolution of the environment is difficult to predict, it may be critical, to think 
about how to organize the operational flexibility of the new system as early as the design or 
the development phases. Several options can during this path be incorporated within the 
technical system in order to maintain its built-in flexibility: 
 
-  Expansion  options  anticipate  increasing  the  capacity  of  the  system in  response  to 
events justifying its growth. 
-  Staging options spread the development of the technical system over several stages. 
The completion of each stage represents an option on the next stage. 
-  Switching option strategies pay a premium to adopting a flexible technology which 
can modify its operational mode by changing inputs, processes or outputs. 
-  Platform  options  aim  to  develop  dynamic  complementarities  and  substitutability 
between successive technological generations. Both switching and platform options 27 
contribute  to  what  Garud  &  Kumaraswamy  (1993)  refer  to  as  “economies  of 
substitution”. 
 
One of the difficulties concerning the management of options during this path relates to the 
fact that once the technical system is in place, it can be very difficult and costly, because of 
path-dependency and complex interactions among the elements of the system, to exercise 
options which have not been taken into account appropriately during the definition, design 
and  development  phases  of  the  technical  system.  Since  built-in-flexibility  options  imply 
generally the substitution or the addition of critical functional elements, a critical step during 
the  set-up  of  a  portfolio  strategy  in  the  presence  of  budget  constraints  and  limited 
information on the value of each option is to determine the outlays to be committed in order 
to incorporate the appropriate options from the very design phase of the technical system 
(Trigeorgis, 1996; Gil, 2007). Following the literature on product design strategies (Ulrich, 
1995; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Schilling & Steensma; 2001), it is useful to consider here the 
very architecture of the technical systems by referring to the modular or integrated nature of 
interactions between components and sub-systems2. These two stylized architectural forms 
may  highlight  the  differences  that  may  be  observed  in  terms  of  built -in-flexibility 
management during the deployment path. 
 
Baldwin & Clark (2000) stress the advantages   of modular systems by insisting on their 
capacity to facilitate the creation and the exercise of options. Modularization might be 
justified because: (1) it makes complexity easier to manage; (2) it allows exploration activities 
on several modules in paral lel, and (3) it increases the tolerance of the system towards 
uncertainty in the sense that particular modules may be renewed after an unpredictable 
event as long as system level design rules are respected. Modular systems have thus a built -
in-flexibility  advantage  which  is  not  given  as  such  for  non  modular  systems.  Such 
modularity can be critical for switching and staging options and for technological platforms. 
The degree of modularity of the technical system during its deployment should also increase 
the value of growth options as well as loosen the constraints restraining the exercise of these 
options and thus increase diversity during the deployment pathway. By contrast, for an 
                                                           
2 The literature on the design of modular products defines the architecture of a product as being the scheme 
by which the function of a product is allocated to physical components and sub-systems (Ulrich, 1955). 
Products with perfectly modular architectures manifest: (1) a one-to-one relation between functions and 
physical  components  or  subsystems,  and  (2)  physically  decoupled  and  standard  interfaces  between 
subsystems and components defined by design rules. In contrast, products with integral architectures are 
defined by complex relationships and tightly coupled physical interfaces. 28 
integral architecture, the economic exercise of an option which has not been foreseen initially 
in  the  design  process  can  be  very  difficult  and  even  impossible.  This  built-in-flexibility 
potential of modular systems refers to the advantages, put forth by Merton (1973), of holding 
a  « portfolio  of  options »  (modular  system)  rather  than  an  « option  on  a  portfolio  of  assets » 
(option on a system). 
 
Modularization  of  technical  systems  entails  however  a  cost  which  increases  with  the 
complexity of the system and which must be compared to the option value of modularity. 
Considering increasing costs of modularity and the difficulties to break interdependencies, 
an alternative strategy may consist in preserving options inside the integral system to create 
operational flexibility within the limits of foreseeable changes that may affect the integral 
system during its deployment or operational life (Gil, 2007). It should be noted however that 
such  preservation  can  also  require  major  investments  in  order  to  confer  to  the  integral 
system a certain level of dynamic flexibility. For an integral architecture, a first phase can 
consist in comparing the costs and benefits of modularization with the costs and benefits of 
option preservation.  
 
Focusing  more  particularly  on  option  preservation  strategies  Gil  (2007)  shows  that 
preservation  increases  the  value  of  the  technical  system  within  which  these  options  are 
incorporated since it reduces the cost of exercising them in the future, provided that the 
design and preservation strategies remain robust with the passage of time. However, the 
investments made to preserve an option, i.e. to keep the option open within the system also 
increases  the  initial  cost  of  acquiring  the  option.  This  initial  cost  corresponds  to  the 
irreversible investments committed for preservation and indicates the unrecoverable costs 
that  could  be  borne  if  the  option  is  not  exercised.  The  essential  trade-off  associated  to 
preservation concerns here the relation between the cost of acquiring the option and the cost 
of exercising the option, knowing that an increase of the former diminishes the latter in the 
future. The critical question is then the following: should the system pay more during its 
deployment phase by investing in the preservation of an option or should it pay when the 
option has to be exercised in some distant future? As argued by Gil (2007), the attractiveness 
of  built-in  flexibility  increases  when  the  perceived  uncertainty  that  the  option  will  be 
exercised, is low. 
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These  two  configurations  (integral  system  versus  modular  system)  relate  to  two  possible 
extreme states towards which the deployment path might evolve. At the same time they 
correspond  to  two  possible  structures  of  a  given  technical  system:  the  first  based  on  a 
concentrated  structure  and  the  second,  a  more  decentralized  one  organized  around 
independent firms. In a technical system aiming to preserve as much  as is economically 
feasible  the  diversity  developed  during  the  de-realignment  path,  modularity  can help  to 
value the heterogeneity and the variety of innovative resources (inputs) available as well as 
the heterogeneity and variety of demand and markets (outputs). This double objective of 
keeping both the heterogeneity of innovative resources and markets increases the value of 
built-in-flexibility,  the  option  value  of  modularity  and  the  attractiveness  of  preserving 
options.  Such  a  perspective  motivates  in  fact  the  flexibility  of  operational  combinations 
between the different components and subsystems of a technical system in order to diversify 
the possible configurations and acquire the adaptive capability according to the evolution of 
the environment and the evolution of the broader landscape within which the system is 
embedded. 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Our paper used the real option perspective to stress the influence of investment strategies on 
technological transition dynamics in the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility. The will 
to preserve flexibility, when firms are confronted with high uncertainty and irreversibility, 
can  in  fact  induce  strategies  which  are  different  from  those  promoted  by  traditional 
investment rules based on the net present value calculus. From the real option perspective 
investment  strategies  are  not  limited  to  a  binary  choice  between  “investing”  and  “not 
investing”.  Rather,  decisions  are  guided  by  the  strategic  exploitation  of  flexibilities  and 
irreversibilities  which  characterize  the  sequential  logic  of  past  and  future  investments. 
Investment strategies do not simply reflect the will of firms to maintain flexibility but also to 
manage and create irreversibilities to come in a strategic way. It is this tension between 
flexibility  and  irreversibility  that  shapes  firms‟  investment  strategies.  As  shown  by  the 
literature on « standard wars » and on network industries, the trade-off between these two 
dimensions is a key determinant of firms‟ investment strategies (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; 
Suarez,  2004).  From  a  real  options  point  of  view  an  investment  strategy  is  a  dynamic 
portfolio  of  options  by  which  actors  manage  in  a  proactive  way  the  sequentiality  and 
temporality of their decisions. It is the importance given by real options reasoning to this 30 
sequential logic that allows an enriched analysis of investment strategies by highlighting 
some determinants – such as the trade-off between learning by exploitation and exploration, 
the will to shape and influence in a strategic way the competition and industry rules of the 
game  as  they  evolve  (e.g.  by  favoring  indecision  through  flexibility  or  by  creating 
irreversibility),  the  endogeneity  of  uncertainty  etc.  –  which  are  poorly  considered  by 
traditional investment rules. 
As  we  have  shown,  the  analysis  of  transition  dynamics  via  real  options  brings  a  more 
qualified vision on investment decisions depending on the pathway considered. Insofar as 
the dominant sources of uncertainty and irreversibility change from one pathway to another 
it becomes important to explicit more precisely the impact of these changes on investment 
strategies of firms. It seems also crucial to better understand the differentiated impact of 
different factors on the value of options according to the pathway considered. In fact, a given 
uncertainty  factor  (e.g.  the  need  for  or  the  absence  of  an  infrastructure,  the  need  for 
complementary technologies, the presence of rival technologies) may affect differently the 
value of an option along the transition process. If some of the uncertainty factors considered 
above  may  well  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  positioning  option  value  during  the 
transformation pathway and discourage consequently holding growth options and prolong 
the term of deferral options, the same uncertainty factors might have a positive impact on 
growth options during e.g. the de-realignment pathway and create cascading effects. 31 
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